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Iowa Supreme Court
(continued from page 107)

repurchase the agricultural land on
the same terms that the bank seeks
to dispose of the land.
The Coles contended that First
Bank's receipt of the sheriff's certificate constituted a purchase of
agricultural land. Therefore, the
Coles argued that First Bank was
required first to offer the certificate to them before it offered the
certificate to the Steeres, as First
Bank held the agricultural land in
accordance with § 524.910(2).
The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the Coles' argument. The court
distinguished between holding title
to real estate and holding a lien on
real estate. The court found that
the sheriff's certificate only created
a lien and was an interest in personal rather than real property. In
addition, the court noted that the
statute applied only to the sale or
disposition of land. Since First
Bank merely assigned the sheriff's
certificate to the Steeres, the court
found that a sale of land had not
occurred. The court held that the
assignment did not trigger the right
of first refusal contained within the
statute.
In addition, the court found that
§ 524.910(2) permitted a bank to
dispose of real property only after
the bank had vested title to the
property. The court noted that only
after a mortgagor's redemption period expired would title vest in the
holder of a sheriff's certificate of
sale. In this case, the redemption
period had not expired prior to
First Bank's assignment of the
sheriff's certificate. Because the
sheriff's certificate did not vest
title in First Bank, the court held
that the right of first refusal contained within the statute did not
apply.
The court speculated that the
legislature probably intended for
the right to first refusal to apply in
a case such as this since the statute
was intended to grant relief to
financially troubled farmers. However, the court refused to legislate,
confirming the district court's interpretation of § 524.910(2).
No Oral Contract Existed
Lastly, the Coles alleged that
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First Bank orally agreed to sell the
Coles a portion of the foreclosed
property for a reduced price in the
event First Bank was the highest
bidder in the foreclosure sale. The
court adopted the district court's
factual findings. The court found
that the Coles' problems with their
line of credit began in December
1985. At that time, First Bank gave
the Coles until April 1986 to pay
their debts in full. In October 1986,
a First Bank official met with the
Coles and their sons in an effort to
resolve the nonpayment of their
loans and avoid future litigation;
the official told them that if they
would deed the property to First
Bank, First Bank would sell them
six acres for $10,000 and would
finance the sale. However, First
Bank and the Coles did not discuss
the particular terms of the deal,
and the Coles did not act upon this
offer. The court agreed with the
district court's characterization of
the conversation as preliminary
negotiations instead of an agreement.
The court found further evidence that supported First Bank's
claim. A letter written to the Coles
by their attorney stated that First
Bank would be more willing to
consider a settlement if one could
be obtained without litigation.
This supported the bank's assertion that the offer was made to
avoid litigation expenses. Finally,
the court cited the Coles' inaction
in other dealings with First Bank as
evidence that the Coles took no
action on the bank's offer and that
no oral agreement existed. The
court held that the Coles failed to
meet their burden of proof to show
by clear and convincing evidence
that a contract existed.
Jonathan Barrish

New York Court Upholds
Rent Control
Regulations Which
Broaden the Definition
of Family to Include
Adult Lifetime Partners
In Rent Stabilization Association
of New York v. Higgins, 562

N.Y.S.2d 962 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1990),
the Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, reversed a lower court decision enjoining the
implementation of amendments to
New York City rent control regulations. The new regulations broaden
the definition of 'family' and increase the availability of rent control benefits.
Background
The New York State Court of
Appeals, in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 544
N.Y.S.2d 784, 543 N.E.2d 49
(1989), recently held that the term
"family," as used in the New York
City rent control regulations, 9
NYCRR § 2204.6(d), Rent Control
Law, included "two adult lifetime
partners whose relationship is long
term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment
and interdependence." 74 N.Y.2d
at 211. In late 1989, the State
Division of Housing and Community Renewal ("DHCR") began the
process of amending its rent control and stabilization regulations
by promulgating an emergency rule
in accord with the Braschi definition of family. The emergency rule
broadened the definition of family
members entitled to rental succession rights.
The prior rent stabilization regulations provided for succession in
two circumstances: first, where the
family member had resided with
the named tenant from the beginning of the tenancy and the named
tenant vacated the premises, 9
NYCRR § 2523.5[b][1] (1987),
and second, where the family
member had resided with the
named tenant for at least two years
immediately prior to the death of
the named tenant. 9 NYCRR §
2523.5[b][2] (1987). The emergency rule promulgated by the DHCR
abolished the distinction between
the named tenant's death or mere
departure. Upon the named tenant's abandonment of the premises, a family member could succeed
to the rights of the tenant, after
residing with the tenant from the
start of the lease or for at least two
years. In addition, the emergency
rule listed eight specific factors to
be considered in determining
whether the requisite emotional
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and financial interdependence existed between the named tenant
and the family member.
A group of property owners (the
"property owners"), sought a declaration from the Supreme Court,
Albany County, that the emergency rule was unconstitutional as a
taking of property without just
compensation and that it violated
other housing-related statutes. The
property owners 'also argued that
the emergency rule was contrary to
the intent of the legislature, and
that it was too vague and therefore
void.
The property owners moved for
a preliminary injunction in the
trial court. The court enjoined the
DHCR from implementing the
emergency rule. Despite the injunction, in March 1990, the
DHCR proceeded to file with the
Secretary of State permanent regulations identical to the emergency
rule.
The property owners successfully moved for a second preliminary
injunction with respect to the permanent regulations in the New
York County IAS Court. The
DHCR appealed the decision to
the Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division.
The Appellate Court's Analysis
The court examined the property owners' arguments against the
DHCR regulations in the context
of the property owners' likelihood
of success on the merits, the standard for a party's entitlement to a
preliminary injunction. The property owners contended that the
regulations were beyond the scope
of the DHCR's rulemaking authority and contrary to legislative intent.
The court found that the legislature clearly granted the DHCR a
broad mandate to protect tenants
and the public interest, a mandate
which would affect landlord-tenant
relationships. Under this grant of
power, the DHCR could amend its
rent control regulations, when the
amendments were enacted to
avoid harm to the family members
of the named tenant who died or
abandoned the apartment. The
court found that the amendments
in question, which extended noneviction protection and responded
Volume 3 Number 3/Spring, 1991

to a shortage of low and middle
income housing, comported with
that broad mandate. Thus, the
court held that there was little
likelihood that the property owners
would succeed on the merits on the
grounds that the new regulations
exceeded the authority of the
DHCR or were contrary to legislative intent.
Alternatively, the property owners argued that the DHCR, in
promulgating the permanent regulations, violated the doctrine of
separation of powers by attempting
to legislate rather than merely
adopt an administrative rule. In
support of their contention, the
property owners cited a series of
bills introduced in the state legislature concerning succession by
"family members," none of which
were passed. The property owners
claimed that the legislature's failure to pass these bills constituted a
tacit pronouncement by the legislature that succession rights be narrowly construed. The court, however, found that the regulations
were enacted in response to the
Braschi decision and were in an
area within the expertise of the
DHCR. Therefore, the regulations
advanced the policies of the regulatory scheme mandated by the legislature; the DHCR did not violate
the doctrine of separation of powers by promulgating the regulations.
On appeal, the property owners
also argued that the amendments
were too vague, and thus void. The
property owners contended that
the amendments provided no criteria for determining when a nontraditional relationship began.
However, the court found that the
amendments specified eight factors to make such a determination.
These factors allowed a person to
distinguish between genuine family members and mere roommates
hoping to benefit from a rent-controlled apartment. The court noted
that the successor to a lease must
demonstrate a familial relationship to the tenant and more than a
passing connection to the apartment. The court held that the
amendments were not vague, as
the amendments explicitly listed
eight factors to be considered in
determining the commencement of

a non-traditional relationship.
Finally, the property owners argued that the new regulations affected unconstitutional takings,
depriving the landlord of the use of
property indefinitely, without just
compensation. The court noted
that the occupancy of the succeeding family member was limited to
the lifetime of that member, making impossible an indefinite and
perpetual family possession of the
property by generations of strangers. Further, the regulation would
not prevent landlords from realizing a reasonable return on their
property because the terms of the
successive leases were limited and
the class of people entitled to succession was limited. Most importantly, both the New York State
Court of Appeals and the U.S.
Supreme Court have upheld rent
control.
The Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division held that
the amendments did not change
fundamentally the character of the
rent control system and therefore
could not constitute a taking.
The property owners failed to
demonstrate on any grounds the
likelihood of their success on the
merits. Therefore, the court reversed the injunction granted below and allowed the implementation of the new regulations.
Tim Brandhorst
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Committee, but the bill faces a
tough floor fight, a competing bill
marked up by the Senate Energy
and Natural Resources Committee
that would leave CAFE standards
to Department of Transportation
("DOT") rulemaking and the
threat of a veto by President Bush.
"I don't think there's any question
that if [the] Bryan bill passes, we're

"This legislation will begin the
process of changing the
conditions that make us so
dependent on the unstable
Middle East and on the oil that
we know ultimately is a finite
resource."
going to have a veto fight," said
Transportation Secretary Samuel
Skinner. "This bill is unacceptable."
According to Deputy Secretary
of Energy, W. Henson Moore, the
administration favors giving the
Department of Energy ("DOE")
and DOT the authority to set CAFE standards. Administration officials also believe that fuel efficiency standards should not be
changed until a National Academy
of Sciences report on the feasibility
of CAFE increases is completed
later in the summer.
Heavy lobbying from advocacy
groups has already begun. The Coalition for Vehicle Choice
("CVC"), an auto industry funded
group, and the Insurance Institute
for Highway Safety say the higher
mileage standards will lead to
smaller cars and more highway
fatalities. "Both science and common sense point to the same conclusion, that smaller cars mean
greater risks in vehicle crashes,"
said Diane Steed, president of the
CVC and former chief of the National Highway Safety Administration. But another safety group disputes such claims. The Center for
Auto Safety, a nonprofit research
foundation, published a study recently that indicated that safety
would not be jeopardized by the
Ii 0

higher CAFE standards.
Environmental groups support
the Bryan bill. A Sierra Club report suggests that higher fuel effi-

.. higher fuel efficiency
standards will save the
country 2.5 billion barrels of
oil a day while vehicles will
remain about the same size.
ciency standards will save the
country 2.5 billion barrels of oil a
day while vehicles will remain

about the same size. "The auto
industry has been crying wolf for
decades," said Dan Becker, director of energy programs for the
Sierra Club. "Back in 1974, when
the first CAFE bill was being discussed, Ford said we'd all be driving Pintos and Mavericks if it got
passed."
Even if the Bryan bill fails this
session, auto industry, safety and
environmental experts agree that
fuel efficiency legislation will remain on Congress' agenda
throughout the 1990s.

ANNOUNCEMENT
The Loyola Consumer Law
Reporter has made available
storage binders for its subscribers. The binders are ideal for libraries to store issues
on the shelf prior to leather
binding. In addition, the
binders are useful for individual subscribers to store issues
to preserve them as research
material in the office library
or as a desk reference.
The binders are graphically
designed to compliment the
appearance of the individual
issues of the Reporter and are
large enough to store eight
issues-two entire volumes!
The binders are available for
$3.50. If you are interested in
ordering a storage binder
simply mail a photocopy of
this announcement. Loyola
Consumer Law Reporter, Loyola University of Chicago
School of Law, One East
Pearson, Chicago, IL 60611.
__

__

Please send me a
Loyola Consumer Law
Reporter storage binder
for $3.50.
__ My payment is
enclosed.
Please bill me.

Name
Address
City
State
Zip
Phone

NEWS FLASH
Can recycling is becoming
an international practice. The
can recycling rate in Western
Europe rose to 20 percent in
1990 up from 16 percent in
1989 and 10 percent in 1987.
In 1990, America recycled
almost 60 percent of the 55
billion cans which were used.
The societal benefits of recycling cans are being recognized. Industry analysts
estimate that the energy
saved in the U.S. in 1990 for
aluminum recycling was
equivalent to more than 20
million barrels of oil. Americans used more cans in 1990
than the rest of the world
combined; however, their recycling rate is not the best.
Sweden, for example, recycles 82 percent of the cans it
uses through a voluntary deposit system.
The 12-nation European
Community's executive body
has supported a draft proposal for member states to increase their recycling of total
packaging waste to 60 from
20 percent and to reduce the
total volume of packaging 10
percent.
The Loyola Consumer Law
Reporter says be a responsible
consumer. RECYCLE!
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